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- Anti-corruption measures and criminal liability applicable to legal persons - Progreso
- National Crime Prevention Strategy: Summary
Joanna Shapland. Peter E. Peter Lilley. Robert J. Nils Christie. Robert D. Tim Caley. David Harding. Stephanie Holt. Michael J. Thomas L. Wilfred Reilly. Sylvia Walby. Stephen Jones. Professor Jonathan Simon. Chris McNab.
Stephen Blumenthal. David Keatley. Adam Graycar. Tim Prenzler. Andrew Goldsmith. Paul Almond. Janice Goldstraw-White.
Claire Hamilton. Tore Bjorgo. Jan Van Dijk. Jason Roach.
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Anti-corruption measures and criminal liability applicable to legal persons - Progreso
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Expected to be delivered to Germany by Christmas. Description Graycar and Prenzler present a readily accessible guide to the issues of public and private sector corruption, outlining the nature and dimensions of corruption problems in a variety of settings across the world, and providing a set of practical strategies to prevent corruption that also facilitate economic growth and development. Product details Format Hardback pages Dimensions x x Intelligence-led policing: A proactive approach to combating corruption.
Corruption causes substantial social and economic harm. The South African government's attempts to combat corruption have relied on strengthening legislation, introducing statutory investigative bodies, initiating public anti-corruption campaigns, and appealing to the integrity of individuals. Yet corruption remains a big problem in South Africa. However, one approach that has yet to be pursued is intelligence-led policing ILP. ILP is a model built around proactive risk assessment and risk management. Corruption has wide-ranging corrosive effects, from undermining democracy and the rule of law, to providing the fertile ground in which organised crime and terrorism flourish.
In South Africa corruption is defined in the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act Act 12 of as 'giving or offering to give, of a benefit that is not legally due to a person vested with the duty by virtue of his or her office, with the intention of influencing him or her to do something, or not to do something in the performance of that duty'. Because both parties involved in corrupt transactions benefit from them, corruption is always difficult to measure. And as South Africa does not have a single database of corruption reports, it is particularly difficult to gauge its prevalence here.
National Crime Prevention Strategy: Summary
To do so, we have to draw on a range of disparate sources. In addition, in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 6 South Africa was the 72 nd most corrupt of countries measured. The National Victims of Crime Survey showed that Calls to the latter are routed to a Case Management Centre from where they are referred to relevant government departments. Departments must in turn investigate allegations and report back to the hotline. Similarly, between and , the Special Investigating Unit SIU , responsible for recovering and preventing state losses caused by corruption, fraud and maladministration, prepared evidence for 26 criminal cases.
It also initiated 31 disciplinary hearings and other remedial actions, such as the cancellation of fraudulent drivers' licences and recommendations on the removal of social grants from the social pension system. Other examples suggested by the PSC are reflected in Table 1. All of the examples listed in this section provide some, albeit fractured, insight into the state of corruption in South Africa.
But is enough being done to address the corruption that is uncovered? This is discussed in the next section. Intelligence-led policing. It would seem that most of South Africa's anti-corruption efforts are reactive. Both industry and statutory bodies rely on whistle-blowing hotlines and internal audits to expose corruption, but the data collected by these bodies is not synthesised. In other words, it makes little contribution to crime intelligence or to efforts to predict and forestall corrupt acts. Considering the ongoing challenges posed by corrupt activities, it is important that alternative methods be considered.
One such method is intelligence-led policing ILP. ILP is a conceptual framework for conducting the business of policing. It is built around risk assessment and risk management. Rather, it is a business process model that determines where resources are needed, facilitates the organisation of knowledge, coordinates activity and allows lessons to be learnt from that activity.
Level one deals with crime incidents and neighbourhood priorities occurring at a Basic Command Unit BCU level, while level two deals with cross-border issues affecting more than one BCU, neighbouring forces, and regional crime activity. Level three deals with serious and organised crime that operates on a national and international scale. A single analytical division exists in the SAPS model, but it is not entrusted with all of the available information for purposes of analysis.
But would a single analytical division, which disseminates tactical, operational and strategic corruption intelligence to policing agencies, not be better than these approaches? The 3i model proposed by Ratcliffe 17 offers such a framework. As illustrated below, the 3i model compels close cooperation between police chiefs, managers and intelligence analysts in order to facilitate strategies that have an impact on the criminal environment.
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The model requires criminal intelligence analysis to actively interpret the criminal environment. Combined with a significant variety in national laws, frequently changing regulations, and ambiguously worded laws, it is argued that non-state actors are needed to complement the fight against corruption and structure it in a more holistic way.
An example for a more inclusive approach to combating corruption that goes beyond the framework set by lawmakers and the foremost role taken by representatives of the civil society is the monitoring of governments, politicians, public officials, and others to increase transparency. Other means to this end might include pressure campaigns against certain organizations, institutions, or companies. Such monitoring is often combined with reporting about it, in order to create publicity for the observed misbehavior.
Those mechanisms are hence increasing the price of corrupt acts, by making them public and negatively impacting the image of the involved official. One example for such strategy of combating corruption by exposing corrupt individuals is the Albanian television show Fiks Fare that repeatedly reported on corruption by airing segments filmed with hidden cameras, in which officials are accepting bribes. Another sphere for engagement of civil society is the prevention by educating about the negative consequences of corruption and a strengthening of ethical values opposing corruption.
Framing corruption as a moral issue used to be the predominant way of fighting it but lost importance in the 20th century as other approaches became more influential. One prominent field of activism for non-state actors NSAs is the area of international asset recovery , which describes the activity of returning property to its legitimate owners after it was illegally acquired through corrupt actions. The process describes the whole procedure from gathering information on the criminal offence that initiated the transfer of assets, over their confiscation to their return.
While recovery is mandated by UNCAC, it is not an activity singularity conducted by governments but attracts actors with different backgrounds, including academia , the media, CSOs, and other non state actors. In this field of anti-corruption activism, representatives of the civil society are often taking a different stance than in other areas, as they are regularly consulted for assisting administrations with their respective expertise and are hence enabling state actions.
Instead of relying purely on deterrence, as suggested by Robert Klitgaard see section on prevention , economists are pursuing the implementation of incentive structures that reward compliance and punish the non-fulfillment of compliance rules.